San Ramon Partition Lawyers

San Ramon is the fourth largest city in Contra Costa County, with a population of 84,605 per the 2020 census. San Ramon is known for its high quality of life and excellent education system.

As of February 2025, the median sales price of homes in San Ramon stands at $1,415,000, with homes remaining on the market for 14 days, according to Redfin. San Ramon residents who own real estate may face disputes with co-owners.

Frequently, there are at least four common types of partitions actions for which a San Ramon Partition Attorney can provide sound counsel:

• Investor-Investor shared ownership of property;
• Boyfriend-Girlfriend share ownership of property;
• Brother-Sister shared ownership of property; and
• Parent-child shared ownership of property

What Is a Partition Action

A partition action occurs when there are two or more title holders to a piece of property, and these title holders are unable to reach an agreement on splitting the subject property. Typically, a litigant brings a partition action to have the court force the sale of or split the subject property. Therefore, when a piece of personal property is concurrently owned by several people, one of the owners may bring a partition action to have the court divide the subject property. In the past, California courts have partitioned not only real estate but also, shares of stock, cash, and businesses.     

Generally, an action for partition can be brought forth by a co-owner of real property and a co-owner of personal property. Notably, a court can partition not only real property or real estate but also personal property of any kind. (CCP § 872.230(a).) The best San Ramon Partition Lawyer will be able to share information on this process with you.

What Are the Steps in a Partition Action?

Generally, a partition action has four stages, which include (1) the filing of the lawsuit (2) an appraisal of the Property under the Partition of Real Property Act, (3) the determination of the parties’ interests, and appointment of a referee to sell the property, and (4) the division of the proceeds from the sale.

In California partition actions, the court must enter an interlocutory judgment where the court finds that the Plaintiff in a partition action is entitled to a partition. (CCP § 872.720.) The interlocutory judgment “determines the interests of the parties in the property and, unless it is to be later determined, the manner of partition.” (CCP § 872.720.) A top San Ramon Partition lawyer will be familiar with the process.

Can You Recover Attorney’s Fees In A Partition Action

Section 874.040 gives courts only two options in apportioning the costs and fees of partition: by ownership interest or by some other equitable apportionment. (see Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 545 (Finney).) 

Notably, appellate courts have found the statutory language of Section 874.040 to give courts broad and equitable discretion. (Lin v. Jeng(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1008.) 

This sentiment that the record must support the allocation of attorney’s fees in an amount greater than disclosed by title is echoed in Stutz, where the appellate court held the trial court erred in apportioning 100% of the attorney’s fees and costs of a partition to the respondent. The appellate court recognized that trial courts are free to apportion fees and costs in an equitable manner yet held that the record must support such an arrangement in “any manner other than according to the respective interests of the parties in the property.” (Stutz, 122 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) 

For example, where a party refuses to simply resolve the issue where the other party was willing to sell, then a court has the authority to order a different amount of fees than disclosed by title. (Forrest v. Elam(1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 164, 174.) In other words, the resistance to selling the property may be a factor that a court considers in awarding attorneys’ fees in a partition action. A knowledgeable San Ramon Partition Attorney will be able to give you good advice on these issues.

What Are Claims for Contribution?

A partition action frequently involves disputes related to the allowance for improvements by one joint owner or the other. The court may, in all partition cases, make an order for an allowance, accounting, contribution, or other compensatory judgment among the parties in accordance with the principles of equity. (CCP § 872.140.) For instance, the court may make an equitable adjustment in order to offset the use value of the property against the improvement expenses. (see Hunter v. Schultz (1966) 240 Cal.App. 2d 24, 31.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 872.140 allows the court to make such orders for compensatory adjustments for items such as common improvements, unaccounted rents and profits, and other matters where contribution may be required. (Cal. L. Rev. Comm. Comment to CCP § 872.140.) An example of these types of improvements could be for remodeling a bathroom, rebuilding a deck, or painting the outside of the house. The property must be divided in a manner that allocates an individual any part that he or she has improved or that individual’s predecessor in interest, to the extent that it is practical and can be done without materially injuring the rights of the other co-owners. The determination of a division of allocation does not include the value of the improvements. (CCP § 873.220.) An experienced San Ramon Partition Attorney will be intimately familiar with these matters.

Case Study of how Intent Impacts Joint Tenancy: In re Marriage of Thornros, (2024)

A partition is a legal procedure in which the court shall segregate and terminate the common interests in a piece of real property, however it must occur between two owners of the property. The following paragraphs discuss how a party’s partition claim fails based on their intent when they cosigned the property. (In re Marriage of Thornros, 2024 WL 1869374.)

In 2004, Sara Thornros and Lennart Thornros bought a home in Roseville which was purchased as Sara’s sole and separate property as Lennart had bad credit at the time. They lost the house in 2012 to foreclosure which caused Sara’s credit to decline. Later in 2012, they moved to a home in Lincoln purchased by the Vart Has Trust to which they were each entitled half. Sara testified at trial that the trust was created to protect the home from creditors in the event of bankruptcy. They then sold the home for $345,000 which was place in the trust. Sara and Lennart separated in April 2016 pursuant to a separation agreement which included the division of property. Through this agreement, Sara and Lennart would keep their half interests in the trust. They also agreed community property laws no longer applied to their property.

In 2016 half the money from the trust was given to Sara with Lennart’s permission to purchase a house (Lyndhurst property), finalized in November of 2016. Lennart was given $117,443.87 to purchase a boat. At trial, Sara testified the 2012 foreclosure affected her ability to finance the purchase of the Lyndhurst property. This mean Lennart had to cosign for the loan. He did this in exchange for a letter of guarantee to ensure he was not responsible for any mortgage payments or consequences of Sara defaulting on payments. The letter was specific to the Lyndhurst property only and stated Sara was solely responsible for the mortgage and Lennart would be reimbursed for any delinquency to the mortgage loan. Lennart would not be held responsible for bankruptcy either. Because they cosigned the title to the property was held by Sara and Lennart as joint tenants. However, Sara exclusively paid for mortgage, taxes, repairs, and improvements. Lennart did not contribute any money.

Sara and Lennart went to trial to determine ownership of the property. Lennart informed the trial court he lived outside the country and may need to appear remotely. During pre-trial matters Lennart had trouble appearing remotely. The trial court advised Lennart of his obligation to ensure sufficient connectivity to appear remotely. In 2021, trial began, with Lennart representing himself. It took half an hour for the trial court to contact Lennart via telephone. The trial proceeded with Lennart appearing via telephone. The telephone connection made it unable for the court reporter to certify the record. The parties agreed to proceed without a court reporter. On the second day of trial, the trial court attempted to telephone Lennart for seven minutes without success. Lennart eventually appeared via telephone. The court reporter again declared it would be impossible to certify the record due to the quality of Lennart’s remote appearance.

The trial court issued a written ruling, disagreeing with Lennart’s argument that the property was an asset of the Vart Has Trust. The court agreed Sara owned the Lyndhurst property as her sole property. The court found the letter of guarantee did not reflect a joint tenancy intent. Lennart was not responsible for half the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and other expenses of ownership. Lennart has also not contributed any money to the property. The amount of money given to Sara from the trust so she could purchase her property was the amount she was entitled to per the trust agreement.

Lennart brought a new trial motion, this time represented by counsel. He argued there was an irregularity in the proceedings, and he was unable to connect to the court’s remote platform because it blocked his foreign Internet address. He argued he could not test for this ahead of time until the link was active which prejudiced him.

The trial court denied Lennart’s motion as he could have appeared in person, and he never requested a continuance based on the remote connection issues. Lennart appealed to the Court of Appeal in the Third District of California, arguing the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and should have ordered a continuance. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s holding. The court of appeal held, like the trial court, because of the issues with getting a transcript of the hearing, only the facts within the clerk’s trial minutes will be relied on.

On appeal, Lennart contended several issues. Lennart argued the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the ownership interest in the property because it was acquired after Sara and Lennart separated. The court of appeal held the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Family Code section 2010 (e) and section 2650. The statutes grant the court jurisdiction to divide separate property interests held by parties as joint tenants or tenants in common. Lennart argued unsuccessfully that there are limits to this jurisdiction citing the Law Revision Commission comments to section 2650 that “Property subject to division [under section 2650] includes property acquired by the parties either before or during marriage.” He argued because the interests in the Lyndhurst property were acquired after marriage, the trial court did not have jurisdiction. The court of appeal countered that the section of the statute was intended to close a loophole where separate property interests even in joint tenancy had to be partitioned through a separate civil action. The court of appeals looked at the plain meaning of the words of the statute and pointed out the Law Revision Commission comments go on to say the provision “is consistent with the general rule that the court has jurisdiction to settle matters submitted to it by the parties.” The court of appeal also held if parties raise the issue in of property at trial it is as if a direct superior court action had been brought regarding that property. The trial court had fundamental general jurisdiction to settle the issue and Lennart was required to object if he wanted to shield the issue. Lennart’s failure to object resulted in forfeiture.

Lennart argued a de novo standard of review should be used by the court of appeals in determining whether the trial court was correct in determining Lennart’s intent to sever the joint tenancy interest by looking at the letter of guarantee. Lennart argued the trial court was required to make its findings according to a clear and convincing evidence standard. The court of appeal held that while the lower court did not state a burden of proof, there was no doubt the parties intended to treat the property as Sara’s sole property. The court of appeal agreed it was the correct standard but assumes the trial court followed the law absent indications to the contrary. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was substantial evidence to support a finding (clear and convincing evidence) that Sara owned the property as her sole property. Parties intended the property to just belong to Sara as supported by Lennart not exercising any of his rights as a joint tenant or putting any money into the property. There was a common understanding with the letter of guarantee that Lennart was not a joint tenant. Ultimately, Lennart was unsuccessful in claiming the trial court did not have jurisdiction or erred in its choice of a standard of review.

Regarding the motion for a new trial, Lennart also did not object to the court progressing with trial once it was discovered he could not participate with video. He also did not object to the court reporter declaring she could not certify the record. The court of appeal held it was not an irregularity in the proceedings and Lennart’s motion for a new trial was properly denied.

How the Underwood Law Firm Can Help

A court’s determination of how a partition sale is to be conducted depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Factors include the validity of interests in the property as well as whether the property was bought outside of marriage. If you are considering partition as an option, or find yourself defending one, then you may benefit from good legal advice on the topic. Please contact Underwood Law Firm, P.C., for an initial consultation.

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